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In response to Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Inno-
cence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005). 
 
That federal criminal trials are an endangered species is clear.  
During fiscal year 2004, only 4% (3346) of the 83,391 federal defen-
dants in terminated cases went to trial.
1
  And, trends that Professor 
Ronald Wright highlights in his insightful article
2
 have continued past 
the end point of his data.  In 1994, 4639 defendants obtained verdicts 
from juries and 1050 from judges; in 2003, just 2909 and 615, respec-
tively, did so.
3
  Every time one thinks that the system has hit an equi-
librium at some “natural” distribution, the trial rate goes down a bit 
more. 
Should we be worried about this?  As an institutional matter, the 
answer is a firm “probably.”  Trials do many things, only one of which 
is to give a criminal defendant the means to put the government to its 
proof before an impartial jury of his peers.
4
  After all, jurors do double 
service; they serve not only as triers of fact but also as dragooned wit-
nesses to a criminal justice process that—but for a handful of well-
publicized “celebrity” cases and the many fake cases on television—
gets all too little attention.  Trials also give us a (small) chance to ad-
dress, or at least assess, the extraordinary agency problem that bedev-
ils a low-visibility system in which advocates for both sides—defense 
lawyers and prosecutors—can hide their sloth or inadequacy through 
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plea bargains.  To be sure, the constitutional standards for ineffective 
assistance of counsel at trial are all too low.  But at least the presence 
of a judge and a defendant, a lawyer’s own self-respect, and the crea-
tion of a record that goes far beyond a guilty-plea allocution, provide a 
starting point for monitoring and review.  Trials also raise the likeli-
hood that prosecutors will adequately monitor and review the work of 
the investigative agents or police officers on whose work they must 
rely.
5
  In addition, trials (may) enlighten the negotiating that occurs 
in its shadow.
6
  Finally, trials give some (perhaps dim) promise that 
the priorities and concerns of the community will be internalized by 
courtroom actors.
7
 
Then there are the needs of the trial participants—which need to 
be attended to, if for only instrumental reasons.  Being “on trial” can 
be an ordeal, but it’s what most of the lawyers in the system (including 
the judges) live for.  It’s their chance to strut their stuff (trial advocacy 
skills or judicial temperament, knowledge of the hearsay rule, etc.) 
and, particularly in the federal system, to develop valuable human 
capital that is extremely hard to acquire outside the criminal process 
(federal civil trials are even rarer than federal criminal trials).
8
  Big 
law firms rarely actually go to trial—they just engage in “litigation”—
but they need to present a credible threat of trial and are ready to pay 
handsomely for that capability.  Without casting any aspersions on the 
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commitment to public service or the zealous advocacy of young prose-
cutors or defenders, one presumes that this aftermarket has a dra-
matic influence on the quality of applicants and the relatively low sala-
ries required to attract them.
9
 
I am not prepared to make the claim that any marginal additional 
funding of the criminal justice system would best be spent on trials or 
even on the adjudicative process generally.  After all, police depart-
ments, law enforcement agencies, and prosecutors’ offices might bet-
ter spend the money on training and internal monitoring.  Although 
someone who used the Constitution as her only guide to criminal 
procedure might think otherwise, we have opted for (or slid into) 
what Jerry Lynch has provocatively characterized as a “prosecutorial-
administrative system” for handling almost all of our cases.
10
  And any 
honest budgeting process should reflect that.  On the other hand, in 
the absence of output measures other than sheer numbers of arrests, 
prosecutions, and convictions, the risk that enforcers would use the 
extra funding simply to bring more cases—not better ones—is consid-
erable.  Such a concern highlights the need to explore the plea data. 
To what extent can one go beyond “fears” and “concerns,” and 
determine that the inexorable reduction in trials actually reflects an 
impairment of the federal criminal system’s truth-finding function?  
Put differently:  should we be worrying about the dispositions that are 
occurring in the absence of trials?  Professor Wright sets out to answer 
these questions by considering the relationship between the trial ac-
quittal rate and the guilty plea rate.
11
  He also endeavors to ascertain 
whether the drop in the acquittal rate, even as the plea rate climbs, is 
a sign that prosecutors and agencies are bringing stronger cases (the 
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“accuracy hypothesis”), or an indication that prosecutors have been so 
empowered by the federal sentencing regime
12 
that they have been 
able to pressure defendants, who would otherwise have been acquitted 
had they not been coerced into giving up their right to trial, into 
pleading guilty (“the trial distortion theory”)?
13
  After carefully con-
sidering the data and taking pains to make appropriate qualifications, 
Professor Wright reports that “dropping acquittal rates over the last 
decade in federal court is a valid cause of concern,” and concludes, 
“The acquittal trend reveals a system that probably distorts trial out-
comes and produces less reliable results than it once did.”
14
 
In assessing the power of Professor Wright’s analysis, we confront 
the fundamental challenge to all quantitative analyses of the federal 
system.  The allure of that system is obvious.  It’s not just that the 
“feds” have always attracted lay and scholarly attention far out of pro-
portion to their relative numbers.  It’s that the same fiscal flexibility 
(or maybe unaccountability)
15
 that allows it to save up to make the big 
cases also permits it to fund unparalleled data-collection efforts.  (The 
fact that only the federal system prints money, and needn’t balance its 
budget, helps too.)  But it has one enormous drawback:  in many as-
pects, it’s not a “system” at all, but rather an adjunct to state or, more 
often, local criminal justice systems.  Indeed, while the involvement of 
a federal judge and correctional facility is generally a nonnegotiable 
feature of a federal prosecution, the rest is up for grabs.  “Federal” 
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cases regularly arise out of arrests by local police working within “joint 
task forces” or on their own, with or without prearrangement with 
federal prosecutors. 
The fact that the “federal” trademark has been thus extended 
(some would say diluted) poses severe challenges to the study of the 
federal system.  Consider Professor Wright’s suggestion that when a 
prosecutor’s office uses new resources to buy extra quantity, “newly 
added cases are likely to involve less serious crimes or less persuasive 
evidence, because the office would have already selected the highest 
priority cases with the first available funds.”
16
  This is quite a reason-
able suggestion, in the abstract, but it is highly contestable when deal-
ing with prosecutors able to tap into an effectively inexhaustible sys-
tem of strong cases involving quite serious street-level gun and drug 
offenses that can “go federal” if the necessary arrangements are 
made.
17
  One might argue, as a matter of policy, that these marginally 
federal cases could be more appropriately handled at the local level.
18
  
But the fact remains that a U.S. Attorney can easily substitute several 
gun cases, presented on a silver platter by local police officers inter-
ested in the higher sentences and quicker processing offered by the 
federal system,
19
 for one complex fraud case that, because it requires a 
long grand jury investigation,
20
 will require an extensive prosecutorial 
resource commitment. 
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Because prosecutorial resource commitments are so tied to case 
mix, aggregate caseload statistics are also hard to interpret.  Professor 
Wright observes that “since caseloads stayed flat during the most re-
cent drop in acquittal rates [during the 1990s], it is hard to believe 
that extra prosecutor efforts in each case produced more accurate 
outcomes during this period.”
21
  However, “[f]rom 1989 to 1998, the 
number of firearms cases filed in the U.S. district courts increased 61 
percent from 2,256 to 3,641.”
22
  By the late 1990s, firearms defendants 
constituted about 4.5% of all federal cases (after having comprised 
less than 2% in the 1980s).
23
  The nature of the announced firearm 
programs during this period
24
 gives good reason to assume that a large 
proportion of these firearms cases were the product of federal adop-
tion of local arrests.  We can be less sure of the narcotics cases (which 
represent a much larger chunk of the federal docket), since that cate-
gory encompasses the products both of intensive federal drug investi-
gations (which might involve considerable prosecutorial commit-
ment) and of collaborations with local authorities that shunted 
prescreened, lower-level cases into the federal system for adjudication.  
But the programmatic commitment to street criminals—of the violent 
and low-level drug-dealing variety—has produced a steady stream of 
federal cases, and of defendants with prior convictions (since street 
criminals are more likely to have prior state convictions) that needs to 
be factored into the data. 
It is therefore quite possible that the vanishing acquittal rate re-
flects an increase in the adoption of well-established “local” cases (that 
even when not “easy,” involve the commitment of nonfederal re-
sources) even as prosecutorial efforts have been spent on making 
stronger cases in the white collar area.  I have no idea whether this is 
true nationally (although it’s my impression that it is true in certain 
districts).  But I need to know more about this possibility before I fully 
accept Professor Wright’s point.  I would also like to know more about 
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the role of immigration cases in the identified trend, and about the 
mix of immigration cases, since that category will include both slam-
dunk cases of illegal entry and far more difficult smuggling cases. 
Although I thus hesitate to join Professor Wright in worrying 
about the “problem” he identifies, I applaud his commitment to 
thinking hard about the trials that might have been.  Having driven 
the factfinding process into law enforcement agencies and prosecu-
tors’ offices, we should not be satisfied with either vague speculation 
about coerced innocents or smug confidence in “voluntary” waivers 
and administrative processes.  We need to know much more, and the 
quantitative rigor that Professor Wright brings to the federal plea 
process is certainly a big (and appropriately careful) step in the right 
direction. 
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